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On December 4, 2009, Baltimore, Maryland enacted the nation's first law
regulating the speech of individuals and groups who want to talk to pregnant
women about whether to have an abortion. Less than two months later,
2nearby Montgomery County, Maryland enacted the second. These
regulations only apply to speakers who want to talk about one particular
subject: pregnancy. As a practical matter, the regulations only apply to
speakers who oppose abortion. Counselors who work for organizations
willing to provide abortions are entirely exempt.
3
Immediately after these laws passed, abortion providers and their allies
across the country began plans to pursue similar speech regulations in other
jurisdictions. For example, an NARAL activist in California explained that
"here in California when we look at [the Baltimore] model we're excited and
curious as to how we can use the model in our own state.' 4 NARAL and
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1. See Scharper, Julie, Pregnancy Center Sign Bill Passes, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov.
24, 2009, IA available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-11-24/news/bal-md.
abortion24nov24_ljeffrey-d-meister-pregnancy-centers-poor-women; BALTIMORE, MD.
CITY ORDINANCE 09-252 (2009) amending BALTIMORE CITY HEALTH CODE §§ 40-
14(e)(7), 41-14(6), available at http://www.baltimorecity.gov/Govemment/CityCharter
Codes.aspx.
2. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. COUNTY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 16-1252 (Feb. 2,
2010), available at http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/council/pdf/res
/2010/20100202_16-1252.pdf.
3. See id. (Montgomery law does not apply to clinics where a licensed person
performs medical services); see also BALTIMORE, MD. CITY CHARTER (2010), available at
http://www.baltimorecity.gov/Government/CityCharterCodes.aspx (Baltimore law only
applies to clinics that refuse to provide or refer for abortion).
4. See Julia Marsh, Baltimore Puts Heat on Crisis Pregnancy Centers, WOMEN'S E-
NEws, December 2, 2009, http://www.womensenews.org/story/abortion/091201
/baltimore-puts-heat-crisis-pregnancy-centers.
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Planned Parenthood are planning similar campaigns in other states,5 and
several state legislatures are already considering similar speech restrictions.
6
Why are these legislatures trying to regulate discussions of pregnancy by
speakers who oppose abortion?
The answer lies in the rise of centers known by a variety of names,
including "limited service pregnancy centers," "pregnancy resource centers,"
and "crisis pregnancy centers." In many cases, these centers are not medical
facilities. Rather, they provide a range of non-abortion resources to pregnant
women, usually in the hopes that women will choose not to have an
abortion.7 The services they provide vary, but often include talking with
women about abortion and its alternatives; free pregnancy tests and
ultrasounds; baby clothes, diapers, and related material assistance; and
information about adoption and help connecting with an adoptive family.
8
Some centers also offer emergency housing, education assistance, and life
skills classes. 9 Supporters claim that tens of thousands of Maryland women
sought help and services at these centers last year, and that they were very
satisfied with the services received.' 0
5. See id. (noting NARAL and Planned Parenthood offices in Oregon and Texas are
also "in the beginning stages of such campaigns").
6. See H.B. 452, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010), available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?101+ful+HB452; S.B. 6452, 61st Leg., 2010 Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2010),
available at http://apps.leg.wagov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20
Bills/6452.pdf.
7. S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Peggy Hartshorn).
8. S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Carol Buchanan).
9. Id.
10. See Penny Starr, Baltimore Law Aims to Undermine Charitable Work of
Pregnancy Resource Centers, Say Pro-life Activists, CNSNEWS.coM, Dec. 30, 2009,
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/59128 ("Not one witness at the hearings who had
used the services of a pregnancy resource center testified that they felt misled, Young
said, adding that groups like NARAL Pro-Choice America and Planned Parenthood have
a vested interest in undermining the work done by the centers. It ultimately cuts into the
profit margins of abortion centers."); see also Kristin Hanson, Care Net Calls Baltimore
Pregnancy Center Bill Nonsensical, and Unconstitutional, CHRISTIAN NEWSWIRE, Dec. 7,
2009, http://www.eamedmedia.org/carenetl207.htm ('The first center Care Net opened,
the Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, has been faithfully serving the
women of Baltimore for nearly 30 years. In contrast to the accusations made by groups
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Critics of the pregnancy centers tell a very different story. They charge
that counselors at these centers often have no medical training and mislead
women with false information about abortion.1" In particular, they charge
that the centers provide false information about the alleged physical and
mental health risks of abortion, including a claimed link between abortion
and breast cancer.12 Critics fear that women will come to these centers
believing they will be provided with access to abortion-or at least receive
unbiased information about abortion-and receive neither. 13  Worse,
pregnancy center critics fear that these women will be delayed in seeking
medical care early in pregnancy.' 4 As a result, they have sought restrictions
requiring pregnancy counselors who do not refer for or provide abortions to
take a variety of steps, including posting signs indicating their position on
abortion, advising women that the counselors are not medical professionals,
and advising them that they should seek counseling from a licensed medical
professional.
15
As legislators across the country are asked to consider these and other
speech regulations governing pregnancy discussions, they may benefit from
a fuller understanding of the history of pregnancy counseling regulations in
Maryland, and from a discussion of the constitutionality of these laws,
particularly under the First Amendment's Free Speech clause. Accordingly,
Part I of this Article will describe the legislative process leading to the
Baltimore and Montgomery County speech regulations. Part II will address
like NARAL and Planned Parenthood, not one client has ever complained about their
experience there." (quoting the president of a group of pregnancy center)).
11. NARAL Pro-Choice Maryland Fund, The Truth Revealed: Maryland Crisis
Pregnancy Center Investigations, 1 (Melissa Kleder, & S. Malia Richmond-Crum eds.,
2008) [hereinafter NARAL Report].
12. See Minority Staff of HR. Comm. On Government Reform Special Investigations
Division, 109th Cong., Report on False and Misleading Health Information Provided by
Federally Funded Pregnancy Resource Centers (2006), available at http://www.
chsourcebook.com/articles/waxman2.pdf [hereinafter Waxman Report].
13. Id.
14. See Press Release, Montgomery Council Approves Regulation Requiring
Pregnancy Centers in County To Disclose Actual Scope of Their Services (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/Apps/CouncilUPressRelease/PRdetails.asp?PrID
=6223 [hereinafter Scope Disclosure Press Release].
15. BALTIMORE, MD. CITY ORDINANCE 09-252 (2009).
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the key questions on which the constitutionality of pregnancy counseling
regulations will turn. Those questions include: what First Amendment
standard should govern regulations requiring pregnancy centers to make
certain statements or disclosures; whether the laws are .content-neutral or
content-based; and whether the asserted government interests are sufficient
to support the laws.16 Ultimately this analysis shows that the Baltimore and
Montgomery County pregnancy speech regulations-and likely the proposed
laws in other jurisdictions-violate the First Amendment.
I. THE HISTORY OF MARYLAND'S PREGNANCY COUNSELING REGULATIONS
The Baltimore and Montgomery County regulations were not the first
such regulations considered in Maryland. Rather, during the 2008
legislative session, the Maryland General Assembly considered a proposed
statewide law to regulate the speech of pregnancy counselors who opposed
abortion.'
7
The proposed law would have required counselors opposed to abortion to
give the following disclaimers before discussing pregnancy options with a
woman:
1. The information provided by the center is not intended to be
medical advice or to establish a doctor-patient relationship;
2. The client or potential client should consult with a healthcare
provider prior to proceeding on any course of action regarding the
pregnancy of the client or potential client; and
3. The center is not required to provide factually accurate information
to clients.
18
The law required all three of these disclaimers to be given "during the first
communication or first contact with the client or potential client."
19
16. This Article focuses on the Free Speech analysis of pregnancy center speech
restrictions. Of course, specific regulations may also raise a host of additional
constitutional problems, including violations of the Free Exercise clause, overbreadth,
and vagueness. Such arguments are beyond the scope of this Article.
17. See S.B. 690 2008 Leg., 425th Sess., at 2 (Md. 2008) available at
http://mlis.state.md.us/2008RS/bills/sb/sb0690f.pdf/. In addition to its focus on abortion,
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The disclaimers were only required for counselors who were unwilling to
"provide or refer for abortions. ' 2 Thus, for example, a counselor at an
abortion clinic would not have to inform a client that he or she is not a
medical professional and that the client should see a health care provider
before making a decision. Nor would a counselor for an abortion clinic be
required to disclose which services were not offered by the clinic (for
example, adoption services or material assistance during and after
pregnancy). Nor would a counselor for an abortion clinic be required to
disclose that the clinic would make money if she chose abortion, but not if
she chose parenthood or adoption. Rather, a mere willingness to refer for
abortion would exempt such a counselor from the law entirely.
A. Two Conflicting Views of Pregnancy Centers
1. Pregnancy Centers Provide False and Misleading Information
Not surprisingly, the debate over the law produced two very different
views of pregnancy centers and the information they provide. Supporters of
the law argued that the pregnancy centers mislead women, and suggested
that they were "engaging in a systematic pattern and practice of deception
and manipulation in an effort to dissuade women from exercising their right,21
to choose." The legislative evidence offered to support this view of the
centers is exemplified by two reports considered in connection with the law:
a July 2006 Report from the Minority Staff of the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Governmental Reform, Special Investigations
Division titled "False and Misleading Health Information Provided by
Federally Funded Pregnancy Resource Centers" (the Waxman Report), and a
January 2008 report by NARAL Pro-Choice Maryland Fund titled "The
Truth Revealed: Maryland Crisis Pregnancy Center Investigations" (the
NARAL Report).
a. The Waxman Report
The Waxman Report22 is based on telephone calls made by investigators
working for United States Representative Henry A. Waxman of California.
The investigators called twenty-five pregnancy resource centers that had
received federal funding under various programs, none of which were in
20. Id.
21. NARAL Report supra note 11, at 1.
22. See Waxman Report, supra note 12.
2010
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Maryland. Each investigator posed as a pregnant seventeen-year-old trying• 23
to decide whether to have an abortion. The investigators told center staff
24that they were already two months into their pregnancies.
The Waxman Report found three principal problems with the information
offered by the pregnancy centers. First, the report found that the centers
"provided false and misleading information about a link between abortion
and breast cancer." 25 The report notes that "[t]here is a medical consensus
that induced abortion does not cause an increased risk of breast cancer," but
that about one-third of the centers called indicated that abortion does cause
an increased risk of breast cancer.26
Second, the Waxman Report found that the centers "provided false and
misleading information" about other physical health risks of abortion,
particularly related to future fertility. 27 The report cites a study explaining
that "women who have their first pregnancy terminated by vacuum
aspiration are at no increased risk of subsequent infertility., 28 Despite this
study, the report notes that approximately one-third of the centers contacted
"informed the caller that she would be at increased risk of fertility problems
from abortion. 29
Third, the Waxman Report found that centers "provided false and
misleading information about the mental health effects of abortion."3° The
report cites various studies that concluded that "severe negative reactions [to
abortion] are rare, and they parallel those following other normal life
stresses," and that women who undergo abortions need psychological
treatment at the same rate as women who continue a pregnancy and give
birth.3 1 The report notes that "[d]espite the scientific evidence that abortion
23. Id.
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at i.
26. Id. at ii.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Waxman Report, supra note 12, at 9.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 11.
31. Id.
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does not cause significant long-term psychological harm" about half of the
pregnancy centers informed women that they may in fact suffer
psychological harm.32 These warnings included an elevated risk of suicide,
"guilt, numbness, dreams and nightmares, changes in relationship ... sexual
problems . . . sadness, anxiety ... alcohol, drug use, eating disorders" and
other effects.
33
The Waxman Report concluded that pregnancy resource centers
"frequently fail to provide medically accurate information" and while "[t]his
tactic may be effective in frightening pregnant teenagers and women and
discouraging abortion . . . [it] prevents them from making an informed
decision and is not an accepted public health practice."
34
b. The NARAL Report
While the Waxman Report focused on centers nationwide that received
federal funding, the NARAL Report focused specifically on pregnancy
centers in Maryland. Like the Waxman investigators, the NARAL
investigators posed as pregnant women seeking help from the centers. 35 The
NARAL Report found that the centers "provide deceptive antiabortion
messages to women" on a number of issues.36 For example, although the
NARAL Report finds that "[tihe medical community has firmly established
that no link exists between abortion and the development of breast cancer,"
the centers reportedly told investigators that abortion does increase the
risk.37 Likewise, "[d]espite abundant scientific evidence to the contrary,"
the NARAL Report found that the centers "continue to cite problems with
future fertility and potential multiple miscarriages." 38 For example, one
counselor reportedly told investigators that "if 'they' do not take out all the
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id.
34. Waxman Report, supra note 12, at 14.
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'body parts' an infection can occur." 39  The Report also found that the
centers claimed that abortion can cause problems with alcohol and
depression.4 °
2. Pregnancy Centers Provide Accurate Information and Support
for Women
Supporters of pregnancy resource centers offered a very different picture
of the information and services they provide. For example, the president of
one group of centers in operation since 1971 testified that the centers
provide services including "pregnancy tests, childbirth and parenting classes,
abstinence education, ultrasounds, post-abortion support, and more.
' 41
Counselors at these centers are bound by a "commitment of care" that
includes "always [providing] honest and open answers" and "accurate
information about pregnancy... [and] abortion procedures and risks.
'A2
The executive director of another center that has been open for thirty-five
years testified that her center's mission
is to help anyone facing an unplanned or untimely pregnancy with the
support and resources they may need to have their baby .... [O]ur
focus is to care for this woman. While we do not provide or refer for
abortions, we also do not turn our backs on her if that is the choice
she has made.43
Another testified that "[o]ver the past 10 years we have served over
37,000 women" who were pregnant, or thought they were, or who needed
referrals for medical, legal, food, or housing and counseling for themselves
or their families. 44
39. Id. Interestingly, this comment is very similar to the account provided by Dr.
Lisa Harris (an abortion provider) in a recent article in the journal Reproductive Health
Matters in which she describes "the task of reassembling the fetal parts in the metal tray
[as] an odd ritual that abortion providers perform-required as a clinical safety measure
to ensure that nothing is left behind in the uterus to cause a complication." Lisa H.
Harris, Second Trimester Abortion Provision: Breaking the Silence and Changing the
Discourse, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 2008:16 (31 Supp.), at 74-8 1.
40. NARAL Report supra note I1, at 4.
41. S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Peggy Hartshorn).
42. Id.
43. S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Carol Maglov).
44. S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Carol Buchanan).
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Pregnancy centers took particular issue with being required to start
conversations with pregnant women by stating that they are "not required to
provide factually accurate information. ' 4 5  The centers argued that this
statement severely diminishes the effectiveness of their speech by attacking
46
their integrity and suggesting that they are untrustworthy. Volunteer
counselors from a range of professional backgrounds testified as to the
quality, accuracy, and honesty of the counseling.
Women who had been to both abortion clinics and pregnancy centers also
48offered testimony in support of the centers. For example, Jennifer June
VanSant testified about her experiences with two prior pregnancies, both of
which occurred while she was addicted to drugs.49 As to the first pregnancy,
VanSant reported:
45. S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Jennifer June
VanSant).
46. See, e.g., S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Carol
Maglov) (noting that the statement about factually accurate information "is unfair [and]
singles out our type of organization by forcing us to unnecessarily undermine our
integrity"); S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Peggy Hartshorn)
(noting that the disclaimer "could discourage visitors from accessing our wide-range of
free services").
47. See, e.g., S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Pamela M.
Thomas, registered nurse and Coordinator of Health Education Center at Prince Georges
Community College) (noting that pregnancy centers "give full, factual, and medically
accurate information" and therefore "regularly receive referrals from the college"); S.B.
690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Beverly Walling, registered nurse
of fifteen years who is currently a licensed psychologist in Maryland) (stating that the
quality of service provided by pregnancy center is "of the highest professional quality...
[n]ever has coercion or duplicity been part of our mission."); S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th
Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Jacqueline M. Stippich, clinical social worker licensed in
the State of Maryland with twenty-five years of experience in women's reproductive
health, including five with Planned Parenthood) (stating that the centers "uphold the
highest level of professional standards in providing care to their clients"); S.B. 690, 2008
Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Sandy Christiansen, obstetrician-gynecologist
of twenty years) (noting that centers are trained "to provide accurate medical information
about induced abortion and its risks").
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At this point I did not believe that it was possible to have a viable
pregnancy. Using a Baltimore clinic, I scheduled an appointment one
day and had the procedure the next. When I arrived I sat in a large
waiting room filled with people and we all seemed to be called back
rather rapidly. When it was my turn, I was asked a few questions and
given Zanax. The Zanax mixed with the other drugs I already had in
my system. The interaction of these drugs left me physically and
emotionally numb. I returned to the waiting room. "Scary Movie 2"
was being shown on the television in the waiting room. . . . The
procedure lasted maybe 5 minutes. . . . At this point I was not
conscious or sober enough to recognize the ramifications of my
decision nor did anyone at this clinic present them to me .... Three
days later I was using even more heavily, spiraled further into the
cycle of addiction and chose not to deal with any of [the] physical and
emotional results of my decisions.
50
Two years later, VanSant was still using drugs and became pregnant
again. 5 1 Although she was "still heavily under the influence of drugs and
addiction" and "thought [she] might kill [her]self," VanSant went to an
appointment at a pregnancy resource center arranged by her mother.5 2 She
described her experience as follows:
After greeting me, I waited for a few moments before a young lady
my age walked me back to a room. It was nicely decorated, like a
home. Emily was kind, considerate, and patient [while] at this
particular time, I was rude, disrespectful, and terrified. She began by
clearly informing me what would happen during my visit. I would
have a pregnancy test, she and I would talk, and then I would be given
a sonogram joined by my mother if I so wished. Emily and I talked
about my circumstance, my boyfriend (who didn't know I was
pregnant), my desire to terminate once again, and what life would
look like if I chose to become a parent. ... We did talk about abortion
since I had already had one. No decisions were made. Emily just
listened and asked questions that made me think, which made me
really not like her because the last thing I wanted to do was really




Maryland's Pregnancy Speech Regulations
Then I met Susan the sonogram nurse. . . The moment came to view
the fetus on the monitor. She asked if I wanted to look. I refused. A
few moments later I could not deny the deep loud heartbeat as I
turned my face to see. A tear streamed down my cheek. I turned my
head shocked that I could actually see any resemblance to a human
being. Susan spoke briefly to the health of the baby and what would
be necessary to provide optimum health for the child. Susan told me
about State funding because I did not have a job or insurance to pay
for medical expenses. She emphasized the need for proper prenatal
medical care and prenatal vitamins. As I got dressed, I cried tears of
relief because these people gave me a sense that it was going to be all
right. Even though I wasn't completely convinced, no final decisions
had been made.
53
Ms. VanSant testified that she eventually decided to continue the
pregnancy and, later, that she "was not ready to be a parent and would make
an adoption plan" for her son. 4 Ms. VanSant testified that her life today is
better as a result of the decision she reached, and that she and her son are
"living example[s] of the power of what [pregnancy centers] do."
55
Although tens of thousands of women a year seek service from pregnancy
centers, the only ones to attend the hearing came to praise the centers; not a
single woman who had actually sought service at a pregnancy center
testified that she had been or felt misled or mistreated in any way.
a. The Statewide Bill Does Not Proceed
Ultimately, the General Assembly did not take action on the statewide
bill. After hearings in the Senate Finance Committee and the House Health
and Government Operations Committees, the 2008 legislative session ended
without a final vote on the bill.
5 7
53. Id.
54. S.B. 690, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Jennifer June
VanSant).
55. Id.
56. See Star, supra note 10; see also Hanson, supra note 10.
57. See Steven Ertelt, Maryland Pro-Abortion Bill Threatening Pregnancy Centers
Dies as Session Ends, LIFENEWS.COM, Apr. 9, 2008, http://www.lifenews
.com/state3102.html. Planned Parenthood concluded that the bill failed because they
could not counter the grass-roots support generated for the pregnancy centers. See
Planned Parenthood of Md., 2008 Maryland State Legislative Summary, available at
2010
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b. The Baltimore Regulation
Although the legislation has not been re-introduced at the statewide level,
in October 2009, a pregnancy center speech regulation was introduced for
consideration by the Baltimore City Council.5s The Baltimore bill was
signed into law on December 4, 2009.
The Baltimore law applies to "limited service pregnancy centers" which
are defined as any person:
(1) whose primary purpose is to provide pregnancy-related services;
and (2) who: (i) for a fee or as a free service, provides information
about pregnancy-related services; but (ii) does not provide or refer
for: (A) abortions; or (B) nondirective and comprehensive birth-
control services.
59
The law does not explain what it means for a person to have "a primary
purpose" to provide pregnancy-related services; nor does it explain what
services qualify as "pregnancy-related services."
60
Regulated centers must provide a disclaimer to "its clients and potential
clients" indicating that "the center does not provide or refer for abortion or
birth-control services," but the regulation does not require abortion providers
to advise clients of the services that they do not provide (such as adoption
help, baby clothes, etc.). 61 In fact, amendments requiring these types of
disclosures were rejected by the City Council.62 Nor does the law require
any disclaimer from abortion providers about whether they have a financial
interest in a woman choosing abortion as opposed to, for example, adoption
63or parenthood. Instead, the regulation is focused solely on speakers who
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/maryland/files/Maryland/2008_legislative-wrap-
up(l).pdf (last visited March 15, 2010).
58. BALTIMORE, MD. CITY ORDINANCE 09-252 (2009) amending BALTIMORE CITY





62. See Ertelt, supra note 57.
63. BALTIMORE, MD. CITY ORDINANCE 09-252 (2009) amending BALTIMORE CITY
HEALTH CODE §§ 40-14(e)(7), 41-14(6), available at http://www.baltimorecity.gov/
Govemment/CityCharterCodes.aspx.
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"provide information about pregnancy-related services" and oppose
abortion.
As at the state level, the focus on speakers who oppose abortion was
deliberate. In fact, the lead sponsor of the bill, Council President Stephanie
Rawlings-Blake, explained upon passage that the law was necessary
because, according to the NARAL Report, women had been misled by
centers that do not provide abortion.64
c. The Montgomery County Regulation
At approximately the same time, the Montgomery County Council began
considering a similar bill. The initial press release from the Council
describing the bill quoted Councilmember Trachtenberg as saying that the
"regulation is needed because [crisis pregnancy centers] often provide false
and misleading information to women ... [and] discourage women from
seeking contraception or abortion. ' 65 The proposed regulation would ensure
that centers opposed to abortion would need to "make sure women are given
accurate information about the [center] from the start of their visits.
' 66
Rather than requiring disclaimers about services that are not provided, the
Montgomery County bill focused on requiring disclosures by centers who
did not have a licensed medical professional on staff and requiring that they
advise women that they should consult with a center that does.
6 7
As in Baltimore, the Montgomery County Council considered evidence
and arguments similar to those presented at the state level. Unlike
Baltimore, however, the Montgomery County Council made several changes
to its proposed legislation in response to these arguments. In particular, in
response to arguments from opponents that the law impermissibly targeted
only centers that oppose abortion, "Council staff conclude[d] that[,] as
introduced[,] the regulation could violate the First Amendment's prohibition
against viewpoint discrimination because it singles out for regulation only
64. See generally Scharper, supra note 1.
65. Montgomery County Council, Worksession Memorandum, January 21, 2010, at
5.
66. Press Release, Councilmember Trachtenberg Introduces Resolution Requiring
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those [centers] that have a particular view of abortion." 68 To address that
concern, a subcommittee proposed an amendment that would regulate
centers without medical personnel "regardless of their view on abortion. 69
Accordingly, the Council rejected the Baltimore approach and removed from
text of the law the provision that expressly focused only on centers that
refuse to refer or provide for abortion.
7°
The law was enacted on February 2, 2010, and requires the regulated
centers to post the following two disclaimers: "(a) the Center does not have a
licensed medical professional on staff; and (b) the Montgomery County
Health Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult
with a licensed health care provider."
71
Upon passage, the Council issued a press release making clear that the law
was designed to target centers that "often discourage women from seeking
contraception or abortion," citing the Waxman Report's investigation of
speech by centers that oppose abortion.72
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE BALTIMORE AND MONTGOMERY
COUNTY PREGNANCY SPEECH REGULATIONS
As legislators across the country are asked to consider the competing
factual stories about the nature, accuracy, and quality of services provided
by pregnancy centers that oppose abortion, they will likely also consider the
constitutionality of any proposed legislation. While the exact form of
regulation considered will of course vary across jurisdictions, these efforts to
regulate pregnancy center speech will likely fail because they violate a host
68. Memorandum from Amanda Mihill, Legislative Analyst on Resolution to Adopt
Board of Health Regulation Requiring a Disclaimer for Certain Pregnancy Resource
Centers, at 4 (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/councilU
pdf/agenda/col/2010/100202/20100202_13.pdf.
69. Id.
70. See generally id.
71. Montgomery County, Md., Resolution No. 16-1251, Board of Health Regulation
Requiring a Disclaimer for Certain Pregnancy Resource Centers, at 2 (Nov. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/counci/pdf/res/2010/20100
202_16-1252.pdf.
72. Scope Disclosure Press Release, supra note 14.
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of core First Amendment doctrines designed to address precisely this type of
government regulation of speech.73
A. The First Amendment Generally Prohibits Government-Required Speech
Pregnancy counseling regulations generally require the regulated speakers
to engage in some form of forced government speech. In Baltimore, that
speech takes the form of a required statement, issued to all patients, stating
that the center does not refer or provide for abortion or birth control. In
Montgomery, centers are required to state that they do not have licensed
medical personnel on staff, and that the County Health Director "encourages
women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care
provider."
74
Generally speaking, the First Amendment forbids the government from
requiring private citizens to engage in government-dictated speech. As the
Supreme Court has explained:
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper
restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the
man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet.
There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant
freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate
end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.
75
The Court also has held that "the government, even with the purest of
motives, may not substitute its judgment as to how best to speak for that of
speakers and listeners; free and robust debate cannot thrive if directed by the
government.', 76  Accordingly, government efforts to force speakers to
73. The Baltimore and Montgomery County laws are likely invalid for a wide-range
of reasons. This Article is only intended to provide a brief overview of some key Free
Speech Clause issues, and is not an attempt to fully catalogue the ways in which these
laws infringe the constitutional rights of the centers and their clients.
74. See Montgomery County, Md., Resolution No. 16-1251, Board of Health
Regulation Requiring a Disclaimer for Certain Pregnancy Resource Centers, at 2 (Nov.
10, 2009), available at http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/council/pdf/res
2010/2010020216-1252.pdf.
75. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)
(quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 776, 244
N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)).
76. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781
(1988). The Court's opinion in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), also is
instructive. In Wooley, the Court considered whether New Hampshire could require
citizens to use license plates with the state's motto "Live Free or Die" on them. Plaintiffs
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convey government messages are subject to strict scrutiny, and are only
permissible when the government's interest is "sufficiently compelling. 7 7
This analysis does not change merely because the required speech is
purportedly factual. Rather, the Supreme Court has held that the general
prohibition on forced speech applies to the exact sorts of mandatory factual
statements implicated by the Baltimore and Montgomery County laws. In
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., the Court
considered several North Carolina regulations concerning the speech of
charities. 78 The government argued that prior forced speech cases were
inapplicable because the government was only requiring true statements of
fact.79 Rejecting this idea, the Court explained:
These cases cannot be distinguished simply because they involved
compelled statements of opinion while here we deal with compelled
statements of "fact": either form of compulsion burdens protected
speech. Thus, we would not immunize a law requiring a speaker
favoring a particular government project to state at the outset of every
address the average cost overruns in similar projects, or a law
requiring a speaker favoring an incumbent candidate to state during
every solicitation that candidate's recent travel budget. Although the
foregoing factual information might be relevant to the listener, and, in
the latter case, could encourage or discourage the listener from
alleged that the inclusion of the motto on the required license plate forced them to engage
in speech with which they disagreed. The Court began its analysis "with the proposition
that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (citing Board of Education v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634
(1943)). The Court then explained that "a system which secures the right to proselytize
religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to
decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking
are complementary components of the broader concept of "individual freedom of mind."
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
77. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716. This general prohibition applies equally to speech by
non-profit charitable organizations like most pregnancy centers. See Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (speech by charities
"involve[s] a variety of speech interests ... that are within the protection of the First
Amendment").
78. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
797-798 (1988).
79. Id.
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making a political donation, a law compelling its disclosure would
clearly and substantially burden the protected speech.
80
For the same reason, the Baltimore and Montgomery County regulations
are impermissible. These local governments, like North Carolina (in Riley),
cannot defend their compelled speech regulations by claiming that they are
merely forcing the centers to state facts, or that the information would be
relevant to listeners.
B. The Baltimore and Montgomery County Pregnancy Counseling
Restrictions Are Not Permissible Under Casey and Rounds
Despite the First Amendment's protection against forced speech,
proponents of pregnancy speech regulations have argued that they are
permissible under cases upholding the state's power to require medical
professionals to provide government-specified information as part of
obtaining informed consent. In particular, Maryland's Attorney General
asserted that proposed restrictions were permissible under Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Planned Parenthood
of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds.8'
These cases, however, concerned state law requirements enacted as part of
the state's regulation of the medical profession and as part of the
requirement that physicians obtain informed consent before providing
medical services. As explained below, they do not permit the type of
regulations of speech by pregnancy counselors at issue here.
In Casey, the Supreme Court held that "a requirement that a doctor give a
woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion"
implicates a physician's First Amendment right not to speak, "but only as
part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State." 83 The Court found no violation of the physician's
right not to speak where they were merely required to give "truthful,
nonmisleading information" related to the patient's decision to have an
80. Id.
81. Letter from Attorney General's Office to Delegate Roger P. Manno, March 14,
2008 at 2-3 citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 884 (1992) and Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v.
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2008).
82. Id.
83. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992).
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abortion. 84 Accordingly, the Court permitted requirements that physicians
provide information about the medical risks of abortion and about
organizations and agencies offering alternatives to abortion. 85 The Court
found that this type of information could be required because it "furthers the
legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion,
only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her
decision was not fully informed. 86
In the Rounds case, the Eighth Circuit addressed a South Dakota
requirement that physicians provide certain information to patients as part of
obtaining informed consent. Among other things, the law required doctors
to inform patients that "the abortion will terminate the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being." 87 Relying on Casey, the court found
that "while the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak the State's
ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician
to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient's
decision to have an abortion."88 The Eighth Circuit found that the required
statement was permissible, noting that it was largely consistent with
statements by Planned Parenthood's own experts.
89
Despite the Attorney General's suggestions to the contrary, any attempt to
rely on Casey and Rounds to insulate the pregnancy counseling regulations
should fail for two reasons. First, unlike the doctors in Casey and Rounds,
the counselors in the regulated pregnancy centers are not engaged in the
practice of medicine. They do not seek to perform medical procedures or
practice medicine, but rather to talk about medical procedures and the
practice of medicine. As such, their discussions of abortion are simply
beyond the state regulatory powers that supported the regulations in Casey
84. Id. at 882.
85. Id. at 902-03.
86. Id. at 882; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), in which the Court
reaffirmed in the context of abortion that "it is clear the State has a significant role to play
in regulating the medical profession" and that "[t]he government may use its voice and its
regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman."
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 128.
87. Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530
F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 736.
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and Rounds. In fact, proponents of the regulations at all levels have been
exceedingly clear in explaining that the pregnancy centers are generally not
engaged in the practice of medicine, and, therefore, not subject to the state's
regulatory authority over the medical profession.
90
Second, unlike the doctors in Casey and Rounds, pregnancy counselors
generally are not seeking to perform surgery or any other procedure that
requires them to obtain informed consent. Doctors performing medical
procedures need to obtain informed consent because, absent such consent,
the procedure would constitute a battery and would expose them to liability.
Thus, while it is entirely consistent with historical practice for state courts
and legislatures to dictate the terms on which informed consent must be
obtained by a doctor, these courts and legislatures have no similar role in
requiring informed consent before merely talking about medical issues,
much less as a required step before merely offering support and assistance to
help someone through a pregnancy. 91 Nor is there any precedent for state
and local governments imposing required disclaimers or statements of
government views before citizens may speak about healthcare issues.
9
2
For these reasons, state and local governments cannot use their powers to
regulate the actual practice of medicine and the terms of informed consent as
a basis to regulate speech by pregnancy counselors. Casey and Rounds do
not apply.
90. See, e.g., Montgomery County Council, Worksession Memorandum, January 21,
2010, at 4 ("Although they discuss issues related to medical conditions (i.e., pregnancy)
[the centers] remain unregulated unless they have a licensed medical professional on staff
or they perform laboratory services."); Letter from Attorney General's Office to Delegate
Roger P. Manno, March 14, 2008, at 2 (pregnancy centers "are subject to no state
licensing or permit requirement, and there is no agency oversight of their activities").
91. For example, while Michelle Obama spends much of her time talking about
medical issues related to proper diet and exercise, she is not engaged in the practice of
medicine, nor could any state or local government regulate her speech by forcing her to
give disclaimers about her lack of training, any biases she has related to food, and/or any
stock holdings she has in food companies. Rather, the First Amendment leaves Mrs.
Obama free to speak about this and any other medical issue of her choice.
92. Indeed, if such disclaimers could be required simply because the speaker wishes
to discuss health-related issues, then the recent discussions over health care policy in the
United States, and likely every issue of this Journal, would be subject to state and local
imposition of speech regulations.
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C. The Baltimore and Montgomery County Pregnancy Counseling
Restrictions Cannot be Justified Based on Claims that Counselors
Previously Provided False and Misleading Information
Proponents of pregnancy speech regulations argue that the laws are
necessary and justified as a response to the "false and misleading" past
speech of pregnancy centers. This argument fails for four reasons.
First, peer-reviewed articles in prestigious medical journals provide
scientific support for the three chief alleged "lies" told by the pregnancy
centers-that there is a link between abortion and breast cancer, that
abortion can cause subsequent fertility problems, and that abortion is linked
to subsequent mental health problems. 93 What the Waxman Report and
NARAL Reports claim to be "lies" are ultimately different conclusions
drawn from conflicting evidence. For example, while the Waxman and
NARAL Reports are correct that the National Cancer Institute in 2003 found
no evidence of a link between abortion and breast cancer, other reputable
sources support an alternative view. Specifically, a 1997 study of 1.5
million Danish women that appeared in the New England Journal of
Medicine, concluded that abortion did not lead to an increase in breast
cancer when judged across the entire population; but the same study showed
an increase in breast cancer rates of thirty-eight percent when looking at
women who had abortions in the second trimester. Indeed, the American
Cancer Society acknowledges that "study findings vary" on this issue.
95
93. Mads Melbye, M.D. et al., Induced Abortion and the Risk of Breast Cancer. N.
ENGL. J. MED. 81, 83 (1997); American Cancer Society, Cancer Reference Information:
Is Abortion Linked to Breast Cancer? http://www.cancer.org/docroot/CRI/content
/CRI2_6xCan Havingan_AbortionCause orContribute toBreast Cancer.asp
(acknowledging that "study findings vary" and that some studies show "a slight increase"
in abortion risk); Peng Xing, et al., A Case-control study of reproductive factors
associated with subtypes of breast cancer in Northeast Chine, 26 MEDICAL
ONCOLOGY 37 (2009), available at http://www.springerlink.com.content/60h727
v546373185/fulltext.prd.
94. See Melbye, supra note 93, at 83.
95. See American Cancer Society, supra note 93 (acknowledging that "study
findings vary" and that some studies show "a slight increase" in abortion risk). Wooley
prohibits the government from requiring forced speech to support the alleged majority
view of conflicting evidence.
The fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New Hampshire's motto
is not the test; most Americans also find the flag salute acceptable. The First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different
from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire
commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.
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Likewise, recent studies in other journals have continued suggesting a link
between abortion and breast cancer,96 and several states actually
affirmatively require that women be informed of the breast cancer and other
health risks in order to provide informed consent.97 Thus, because the
speech has scientific support, the laws cannot be justified as responses to
98"false and misleading" speech.
In any case, speech about a different interpretation of conflicting evidence
is not proscribable, because "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705.
96. See Peng Xing, supra note 93.
97. MINN. STAT. § 145.4242 (2010) (prohibiting abortions without informed consent
and providing that such consent is only effective if the women is informed of "the
particular medical risks associated with the particular abortion procedure to be employed
including, when medically accurate, the risks of infection, hemorrhage, breast cancer,
danger to subsequent pregnancies, and infertility); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 171.012 (2009) (consent only valid if woman is told of "the possibility of increased risk
of breast cancer following an induced abortion and the natural protective effect of a
completed pregnancy in avoiding breast cancer").
98. Similar scientific evidence exists to support the centers' claims about the
physical and mental health risks of abortion, or at the very least demonstrate the existence
of a legitimate medical dispute over which the government should not pass laws to
penalize speakers with one view or another. See David M. Ferguson et al., Abortion and
mental health disorders: evidence from a 30-year longitudinal study, 193 BRIT J.
PSYCHIATRY 444, 449 (2008) (finding that "women who had had abortions had rates
of mental disorder that were about 30% higher than other women"); "The specific issue
of whether or not induced abortion has harmful effects on women's mental health
remains to be fully resolved. The current research evidence base is inconclusive - some
studies indicate no evidence of harm, whilst other studies identify a range of mental
disorders following abortion." The Royal College of Psychiatrists, Position Statement on
Women's Mental Health in Relation to Induced Abortion, Mar. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/member/currentissues/mentalhealthandabortion.aspx; P.S.
Shah on behalf of Knowledge Synthesis Group of Detrimants of preterm/LBW births,
Induced termination of pregnancy and low birthweight and preterm birth: a systematic
review and meta-analysis, 116 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1425
(2009), available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122591273
/PDFSTART (finding that abortion increased risks of preterm delivery and low birth
weight in future pregnancies).
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competition of other ideas." 99  Thus it is no surprise that, even while
purporting to regulate the centers because of this speech, Montgomery
County specifically acknowledged that the centers "can cite alternate studies
to their clients."'
'00
Third, it is well established that the government cannot regulate present
and future speech based on past legal speech.' 0  Thus, just as the
government cannot outlaw discussion of conflicting study results, it is also
barred from regulating pregnancy counselors' speech based on their past
discussions of this information.
Finally, governments cannot defend pregnancy speech regulations by
defining them as "commercial speech." Although regulations to ensure the
accuracy of commercial speech can be permissible in certain
circumstances,' 0 2 those circumstances do not apply here. As explained by
the Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, the
ability to regulate commercial speech extends only to "expression solely
related to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."10 3 Here,
the pregnancy centers have no economic interests at all-they are non-profit
centers that do not charge for their services. Moreover, the primary
argument against these centers is that they have a political, social, and/or
religious agenda to dissuade women from seeking abortion-in other words,
the exact opposite of the "solely economic" speech to which the commercial
speech analysis applies.
10 4
99. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-341 (1974).
100. Montgomery County Council, Worksession Memorandum, January 21, 2010, at
2.
101. See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308, 310-11 (1980);
Ackerley Communications of Massachusetts, Inc. v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513,
520-21 (1st Cir. 1989); Eller Media Co. v. Montgomery County, 143 Md.App. 562, 601,
795 A.2d 728, 751 (Md. App. 2002) (deeming "well-founded" the claim that the First
Amendment prohibits regulation of future speech based on past lawful speech).
102. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
103. Id. at 561.
104. Nor can the government deem the centers' speech commercial simply because it
is speech about a commercial enterprise, namely abortions provided for money. The
Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976) ("[T]he speech
whose contend deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial
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D. The Baltimore and Montgomery County Pregnancy Counseling
Restrictions Are Impermissibly Targeted in That They Are Content-Based,
Viewpoint-Based, and Speaker-Specific
1. The Laws Are Content-Based And Invalid
As the Supreme Court has explained, "[i]t is axiomatic that the
government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the
message it conveys." ' 0 5 Thus, while content-neutral speech restrictions can
be permissible in certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that content-based restrictions of speech are presumptively
unconstitutional.
10 6
The Baltimore and Montgomery County regulations are content-based
because they single out speech regarding one, and only one, subject-
pregnancy-for special restrictions and financial penalties. The laws are
clearly content-based, and, therefore, unconstitutional, because their
application is entirely governed by whether or not speakers discuss a single
regulated topic-pregnancy.
For example, imagine three different groups want to open centers in
Montgomery County. One group wishes to use its center to offer citizens
information about heart health and obesity. A second group wishes to use its
center to educate people about the dangers of smoking and illegal narcotics.
A third wishes to offer information about adoption, childbirth, and available
free support for women who wish to carry a pregnancy to term. None of the
proposed centers employs a doctor or nurse; all three will be discussing
important medical and health-related information to some extent.
Under the proposed law, only one of these centers needs to post a sign to
expressly tell their audience that they are not doctors, and that the Health
Director recommends that they see a doctor. How does one tell which center
needs the sign and which do not? The answer turns on the content of their
speech. The center that wishes to talk about options for pregnant women has
subject. No one would contend that our pharmacist may be prevented from being heard
on the subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical process should be regulated or their
advertisement forbidden."). Thus, for example, while the sale of cigarettes is
undoubtedly a commercial enterprise and can be regulated as such, an anti-smoking
campaign would not be. Id.
105. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828-
29 (1995) (citing Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
106. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.").
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to post a sign or risk burdensome fines. The others remain free to speak on
their own terms, because the content of their speech-while involving
important medical information conveyed by non-doctors--does not concern
pregnancy. The application of the law thus turns entirely upon the content
of speech. This is the essence of content-based regulation, and it is precisely
what the First Amendment forbids.'
0 7
2. The Laws Are Viewpoint-Based And Invalid
Viewpoint discrimination is a particularly pernicious form of content
discrimination. For this reason, it is presumptively unconstitutional and
essentially forbidden. As the Supreme Court has explained:
When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views
taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment
is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious
form of content discrimination. The government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.
Here, the text, history, operation, and public justification for the Baltimore
and Montgomery County pregnancy speech regulations confirm that they
target speakers with a particular viewpoint. The laws are therefore invalid
viewpoint-based speech restrictions.
The text of the Baltimore law is viewpoint-discriminatory. The law does
not apply to all discussions relating to pregnancy, nor does it apply to all
discussions of pregnancy by speakers without medical licenses. Rather, it
applies only to those discussions of pregnancy by a particular group of
speakers who are, thus, regulated solely because they refuse to "refer or
provide for abortion." By using a speaker's position on abortion to
determine whether or not to regulate speech, the law is impermissibly
viewpoint-based. 109
107. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
108. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29.
109. Indeed, the Washington Post editorialized that this type of regulation "is suspect
because it singles out pregnancy centers while absolving abortion clinics of any
disclosure requirements regarding adoption or parenting options." Editorial, Pregnant
and In Need of Help, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2009, at A18, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/I 1/22/AR2009112201605.h
tml. Likewise, the Montgomery County Council staff concluded that the Baltimore
approach "could violate the First Amendment's prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination because it singles out for regulation only those [centers] that have a
Maryland's Pregnancy Speech Regulations
Because county officials recognized the potential constitutional problems
with the Baltimore approach, Montgomery County amended its bill in a
purported effort to eliminate viewpoint discrimination.' l0 The County's
proposed solution, however, fails to solve the viewpoint discrimination
problem. Rather than regulate pro-life pregnancy centers and abortion
clinics in the same way-requiring each, for example, to clearly disclose
what other services they do not provide, or requiring each to disclose any
financial interest they have in a woman choosing one option over others-
the council instead expanded its regulation to a group of facilities that appear
not to exist: abortion clinics without medical staff. There was no evidence
before the legislature that a single such facility exists in Montgomery
County or anywhere else. Thus, the Montgomery County law simply uses a
different mechanism-the proxy of a health care provider-to sort between
pro-life and pro-choice facilities. Worse, when the law was enacted, the
Council continued to explain to the public that the point of the law was to
regulate pro-life centers.
3. The Laws Discriminate Among Speakers And Are Invalid
As set forth above, the history and text of the Baltimore and Montgomery
County pregnancy counseling laws confirm that they are aimed only at
specified speakers. Thus, for example, counselors at abortion clinics remain
entirely unregulated in their discussions of pregnancy, while counselors at
pregnancy centers opposed to abortion are regulated. This leads pregnancy
center speech regulations to another First Amendment problem: the
government is not free to decide to regulate the speech only one side of a
contentious public debate. 
1 2
Given the Supreme Court's recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, this type of speaker regulation is impermissible under
particular view of abortion." Montgomery County Council, Worksession Memorandum,
January 21, 2010, at 2.
110. See id.
11. Scope Disclosure Press Release, supra note 14.
112. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (government may
not "license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow
Marquis of Queensberry rules"); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994)
("[A]n exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a
governmental 'attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in
expressing its views to the people."') (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978)).
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the First Amendment." 3 In Citizens United, the Court addressed regulations
on campaign-related speech by certain corporations. The Court explained
that the First Amendment does not permit the government to make such
speaker distinctions:
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment
stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.
Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different
speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. As instruments to
censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on
the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content. Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content,
moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when
by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to
speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the
disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to
establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice .... We
find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political
speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain
disfavored speakers. 
1 14
Here, the proposed speech regulations apply only to certain speakers who
wish to talk about abortion-the most contentious political and social issue
of our time. In this manner, the government would be "impos[ing]
restrictions on certain disfavored speakers" in precisely the way forbidden
by the Court. 1l 5 Citizens United makes clear that the Constitution does not
permit the government to create different rules for different speakers.
E. The Baltimore and Montgomery County Regulations Fail Strict Scrutiny
Because the Baltimore and Montgomery County laws involve forced
speech, and because they impose content-based, viewpoint-based, and
speaker-specific speech restrictions, they are presumptively unconstitutional
and can only be upheld if they survive strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny
requires that a law be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
The pregnancy speech regulations fail this test for three reasons.
113. See generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, No. 08-205, 558
U.S. __ (2010), 187 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2961 (US, Jan. 21, 2010).
114. Id. at *24-25 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
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1. Absence of Evidence
First, the relevant legislative bodies lacked evidence that any of the tens of
thousands of clients of the pregnancy centers were coerced, misled, or
mistreated in any way. In fact, the Montgomery County Council publicly
declared that it was "unfair" to expect the council to have evidence that any
of the women utilizing the centers were misled. 116 The law does not permit
the government to regulate speech-much less to regulate it in a content,
viewpoint, and speaker-based manner-when it is merely assuming the
existence of a problem. To the contrary, "[w]hen the Government defends a
regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated
harms, it must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease sought
to be cured."'" 7 The absence of evidence that any person was actually
misled is fatal because the government "must demonstrate that the recited
harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.""
' 18
2. Underinclusivity
Second, the laws are fatally underinclusive in several respects. An
underinclusive law can violate the First Amendment where it "represent[s] a
governmental 'attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an
advantage in expressing its views to the people.""' 9 An examination of the
underinclusiveness of regulations concerning pregnancy counseling here
confirms the content- and viewpoint-discriminatory nature of such
provisions. These regulations tend to be underinclusive in three principal
ways: they leave unregulated all discussions of critical healthcare issues by
non-medical speakers discussing topics other than pregnancy; they leave
unregulated discussions of pregnancy by non-medical counselors at abortion
clinics; and they leave unregulated all discussions of pregnancy by school
guidance counselors, teachers, friends, parents, priests, and any number of
other individuals who may be asked for advice concerning pregnancy. This
116. Board of Health Regulation Requiring a Disclaimer for Certain Pregnancy
Resource Centers, Hearing on Resolution No. 16-1252 before the Health and Human
Services Committee, Montgomery County Council (January 25, 2010) (Statement of At-
Large Council Member George Leventhal).
117. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).
118. Id.
119. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) (citing First Nat. Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978)).
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type of underinclusiveness reveals that the government's allegedly neutral
interest either is not the true motivating factor, or that the government itself
does not view that interest as compelling enough to regulate all instances of
speech in which that interest is threatened.120
a. Failure to Regulate Other Discussions of Medical Issues by
Non-Licensed Speakers
The law is underinclusive in that it leaves unregulated the vast majority of
discussions of medical issues by non-licensed speakers. Citizens learn about
health issues from a wide variety of sources. Yet the regulations only
require disclaimers for one particular group of pregnancy centers. Thus, for
example, speakers at Jenny Craig and Weight Watchers centers and trainers
at health clubs, remain free to discuss health, lifestyle, nutrition, and obesity
without required disclosures as to their services, viewpoints, or status as
non-physicians. Likewise, employees at GNC stores, health food stores,
anti-drug and anti-smoking groups, health and hygiene teachers, and
countless other speakers, also remain free to speak without making required
disclosures as to their services, viewpoints, or status as non-physicians. The
failure to protect the same alleged interest in these other instances where
non-doctors communicate about serious medical issues renders the laws
fatally underinclusive.
b. Failure to Regulate Pregnancy Discussions at Abortion Clinics
The laws are also underinclusive as to pregnancy discussions. While the
governments assert an interest in ensuring that women receive complete and
accurate information about pregnancy options, and that they be advised of
services they will not receive at a pregnancy center, the laws do not apply
these restrictions to abortion clinics. In Baltimore, this underinclusiveness
arises from limiting the application of restrictions to centers that refuse to
provide abortions or refer women to abortion providers. In Montgomery
County, the underinclusiveness stems from the County's unwillingness to
regulate discussions of pregnancy options at abortion clinics, even if those
discussions are conducted by someone who is not a licensed medical
professional. If the government were neutrally pursuing its asserted
interests, abortion clinics should be required to provide truthful information,
and women who speak with non-doctors at the clinics should be advised that
120. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1105 (2009) ("The
statute's discriminatory purpose is further evidenced by its substantial .
underinclusiveness with respect to the State's asserted interest in passing the
legislation."); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703. 724 (2000) (a content-neutral statute is one
that "does not distinguish among speech instances that are similarly likely to raise the
legitimate concerns to which it responds").
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they should seek help from a medical professional. The failure to regulate
speech at abortion clinics reveals that the even the government does not
view its asserted interests as compelling.
c. Failure to Regulate Other Discussions of Pregnancy
Even the treatment of pregnancy discussions is underinclusive. For
example, if the County's concern is with discussions about pregnancy by
non-doctors, why does the Montgomery County law only focus on those
discussions at centers that discuss pregnancy but do not employ a doctor for
twenty hours per week? Pregnant women have discussions with all sorts of
non-medical speakers about their options. For example, some pregnant
women presumably discuss their options with school guidance counselors
and/or teachers. Yet the proposed law makes no effort to regulate these
discussions. Likewise, other pregnant women presumably discuss options
with social workers-these discussions, too, remain unregulated. Indeed, it
is fair to say that most discussions of pregnancy options occur with speakers
such as friends, family members, and others who are not covered by the
proposed law. If the law were motivated by a governmental interest in
regulating these conversations-as opposed to targeting a specific group of
discussions at pro-life pregnancy centers-the law would apply far more
broadly.
3. Lack of Tailoring
Finally, the law fails strict scrutiny because it is not tailored to the
government's asserted interests. To be narrowly tailored, a restriction on
speech must target the "exact source of the 'evil"' sought to be avoided. 121
If the government wishes to outlaw the centers' statements about the health
effects of abortion, it should attempt to pass a law to that effect. Likewise, if
the government wishes to publicize the message that the County Health
Director thinks pregnant women should see a doctor, the government should
advertise and distribute that message directly, rather than doing so indirectly
by forcing unwilling citizens to post the sign on private property.
Rather than tailoring the law to these assertedly neutral justifications,
Baltimore and Montgomery County have enacted laws that are tailored not
toward addressing allegedly neutral problems, but toward requiring one
specific group of speakers to provide government-dictated disclosures.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, pregnancy speech regulations are likely
unconstitutional, both in Maryland and beyond. Fundamentally, this
problem stems from an improper motive to regulate speakers on only one
121. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 475 (1988).
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side of a contentious public debate, a lack of evidence of actual dissatisfied
clients, and a law that focuses only on speech about a single issue, from a
single perspective, and from a single type of speaker. Particularly where, as
here, there is conflicting evidence about the impact of a medical procedure,
there is no basis for the state to punish speakers for espousing a minority
viewpoint. Rather, the First Amendment protects the rights of pregnancy
centers and their counselors to speak freely about abortion and other issues,
without subjecting themselves to greater liability or to targeted restrictions
of their speech.
